

Ex-835

AUTOGRAPH TESTIMONY

P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army
of the Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seiichi.
From April 20 to April 23, 1946.

I, former Commander of the first Area Army of Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seiichi shall state about the preparation for sei-ure of Manchuria and the attack against U.S.S.R. by Japan.

At the beginning of Showa era, i.e., in 1926, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused by the anti-northern expedition carried out by Sun-Bun and CHIANG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area would be contradicted. The Japanese government, therefore, decided the following measures:

1. That the civil war of China shall not be allowed to extend over Manchuria.
2. That the influence of Sun-Bun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria.
3. That the government of CHANG Tsuc-lin in Manchuria shall be supported to the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penetrating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself.

These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TANAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1927. The then War Minister was General UGAKI.

In May 1928, the nationalist forces in North China smashed the resistance of CHANG Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attaché to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the order of the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA, and was attached to Military Attaché, Major-General SATO, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and customs of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the important persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHENKIANG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Nanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Nanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Nanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEN KIANG with the

object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expedition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HO Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HO Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. Besides this person, I was on good terms with the vice-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Nanking Government, CHEN-Yi, Inspector-General of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHU Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General HUANG, MU-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt. General YANG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attaché to the Embassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Nanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA:

1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Nanking Government.
2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria.
3. To form friends among the military circles of the Nanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties.

I received the same instructions from the military attaché to the Embassy, Major-General SATO in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Nanking, to pay attention to the situation of military administration of the Nanking Government. After my arrival in Nanking, I established contact with the above-mentioned military authorities of the Nanking Government and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Nanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelligence work -- the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confrontation of the Chinese military cliques, the existence of anti-government elements and so on. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelligence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better relationship with the military authorities of the Nanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents. Not long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was NAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSINGAN LING near Solon. Captain NAKAMURA was one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING. After my arrival as Chief of the second section of the Headquarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the said NAKAMURA was dispatched with the object of investigating the roads in HSING AN LING and I am convinced of the statements being true.

I think I can safely say concerning the Japanese preparation for the occupation of Manchuria that the fact that Japan has long been covetous of Manchuria could be testified by the condition before the Manchurian Incident and by various other situations there. Japan wanted to have military bases in Manchuria for the execution of aggressive plans against Soviet Russia. The construction of strategic railway lines in Korea such as the Seoul-Fumen line, the Ranan line, and the Tusan-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realize this cherished plan some proper historical time had to be chosen. The year of 1931 afforded a good opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Russia were absorbed in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five-year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the expeditionary forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in the occupation of the whole of Manchuria. Following the occupation, Japan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo. There were two opinions--one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese adviser in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Manchukuo, and to keep the real power of the country in the hands of Japan. The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. ISHIMARA and Col. ITAGAKI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung Army, and was supported by Gen. ARAKI. In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of vice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in various Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung Army made it their primary task to annihilate all the anti-Japanese elements either by subjugating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive expeditions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chinchor, and in the vicinity of TUNG PIEN TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chan-shan and LI-Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive campaigns. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAKE and Lt. Gen. KOISO when Generals Honjo and Muto were commanders of the Kwantung Army. These punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to bankruptcy. We cannot but definitely admit that such operations caused the dispersion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember well the amount and scope of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. NISHI. Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows:

1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRIN the 10th Division
(Commander, Lt. Gen. HIROSE)
2. The vicinity of Chinchor and Jehol the 8th Divis on
(Commander, Lt. Gen. NISHI).

3. The Province of HELLUOZIANG and the vicinity of CHINHOLERI the 14th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MAISONI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku.)
4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt.Gen.SAKAMOTO)
Mixed brigade (Commander, Maj. Ge. HATTORI)

A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jeohol was directly commanded by the commander of Kwantung Army General MUTO and I also participated in the Jeohol operations. I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chief of staff of Kwantung Army the data of intelligence concerning both the doings and movements of the anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on my reports. In the spring of 1934 a large scale military operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, south of CHIA MU SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the Manchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Manchurian possessed land by the Manchurian Development Company of Japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKA. In order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, the Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their own regimental Commander Col. IIZUKA, they caused enormous damages to the Manchurian residents. This fighting was directed by the chief of staff Col. KINO of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen.HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the period from 1931 to 1936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army--Generals HONJO, MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations were chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, Maj. Gen. KOM. TSUBURA, the Representative of the South Manchuria Rly. Company in Harbin. Director USAMI and other agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters. I cannot flatly deny the fact that Japan made use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel the influence of Soviet Russia from Manchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway administration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Manchuria were disturbed by bandits.

In 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to sell the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys. After that Japan gradually enlarged her preparation for military bases in Manchuria for war against Soviet Russia. Along with it, the building of fortresses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes,

the construction of railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction of HARBIN harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the establishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Japanese Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry out these plans, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by myself.

1. The fortification department to build fortresses.
2. The air force units to build air-fields.
3. The Manchurian Civil Engineering Bureau to build military roads.
4. The Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company to establish communications.
5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Rly Company.
6. The Manchurian Heavy Industry Company shall be founded for the establishment and management of munition factories.

The Japanese authorities, either purchased at low prices by compulsion the land owned by Manchurians or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among the Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the free laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Moreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Manchurian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. HATA and General USHIROKU explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell me the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000.

Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, INUKAI, KONOUE, and General TOJO; Japanese War Ministers Generals ARAKI, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KANAYA, Prince KAM-IN, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals HONJO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI, UEDA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1934 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAM-IN, Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of the 1st department, Maj. Gen. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Maj. Gen. ISOYA (later Lt. Gen.), and chief of the 3rd department, Maj. Gen. USHIROKU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of the intelligence pertaining to China and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China group (chief, Lt. Col. KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WACHI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work was executed

by studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korea Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the various countries, especially from the attachés at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Peking, Nanking, and Canton, together with those from the Navy and Foreign Ministers. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, but nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forces in Manchuria was furthered and in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Army to four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalions) and four frontier garrisons, was realized.

In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung Army instructions pertaining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933.

The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy:

In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Negotiations relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1935 between the military attaché to the Embassy in Germany, Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attaché OSHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure, but I, as well as other persons clearly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature was provocative to Soviet Russia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist politics of Soviet Russia, and that it was necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual preparation for war against Soviet Russia and also in the interference in the internal administration of China.

The days when I was the Military Attaché to the Embassy in China:

In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Attaché to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to be solved by the Ambassador were as follows:

1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.
2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall co-operate economically.

3. China shall cooperate with Japan in anti-Comintern activities.

I remember that as the compensation for the above three conditions Japan promised China economic and technical aid. Although in June 1936, Ambassador KAWAGOE began negotiations with the Nanking Government on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following answers as to the proposals offered by Japan:

1. China will not officially recognize Manchukuo, but will connive the situation in Manchuria.
2. China herself will resist Communism. Materially speaking, China is fighting against the Pa Lu Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti-Japanese movements in China by its own power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual.

The Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attaché to the Embassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows: "I shall collect intelligence regarding the political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same time co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relations between both countries." I went from time to time to Nanking and saw the Ambassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937, Japanese troops stationed in the suburbs of Peking on manoeuvres were fired upon by the Chinese. Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed. Japan later announced in the press and to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHUNG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai. This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War.

The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board (KO-A-IN).

In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese War the North China Area Army was established in Peking. At the same time, I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I was appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the Special Service Section

were to execute the work of Military administration, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied areas in China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section.

1. General Affairs Bureau--in charge of political matters.
2. First Economic Bureau--in charge of finance and economy.
3. Second Economic Bureau--in charge of traffic and industries.
4. Culture Bureau--in charge of education and culture.

Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in North China while I was chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a regime in North China with Weng Ko-min, a pro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese representatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the advisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIRAO Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigeo. These three were not military men. The principle of the advisers was to carry out the policies of the Japanese government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain). I was appointed Chief of the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board. I received this appointment from the cabinet, HIRANUMA was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier HIRANUMA was the head and the president. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. General ITAGAKI, THE Navy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister; and there were about sixty board members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YANAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could become board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chief of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jap.-U. S. war when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such as Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Asia Development Board was greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territories in Greater East Asia, a larger and stronger organization based on the Asian Development Board was required. Consequently, in the beginning of 1942, the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the duty of the Chief of the

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Liaison Section of the Board was transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria, TANI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation. While I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in North China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our North China Army and to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the North China Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (later full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAN, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, when the Mongolian Army was established its Commander was Lt. General HASUNUMA, the Special Service Agency was changed into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief). In November 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Hsinkiang government headed by Prince Te. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our object at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a military base there against Outer Mongolia. This measure was carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The assistance which I offered to the measure for the taking of Inner Mongolia was in creating in North China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our North China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles at Chang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by Lawless actions of the Japanese Army; and since the details and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here.

In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunonuya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Highness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihachir with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not necessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against the Soviet Russia.

When I was in Chichihaejh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Haireach, as the division would be employed on the Haireach plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should be carried out so as to be chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Russian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Haireach executed map strategic manuevers in the vicinity of Haireach twice in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against Russia. This increase was executed in accordance with a plan known as "Ken-Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Manuevers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by 5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the "Ken-Toku-En" consisted of:

| | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 13 divisions..... | 195,000 men |
| 2 tank divisions..... | 30,000 men & 400 tanks |
| Air forces..... | 24,000 men & 1,000 planes |
| Border guards (28 battalions)..... | 19,000 men |
| Railway guards (5 units)..... | 17,500 men |
| Rear forces..... | 100,000 men |
| Total... (men)..... | 386,00 |
| | (horses)..... 40,000 |

It now possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses due to the increase made by the "Ken-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division under my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered that similar increases were made in other divisions.

When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten preparations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not read it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order except an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Army ordered the 23rd Division at Haireach to build field fortifications on the heights east of Haireach in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All the conditions in Kwantung Army during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, as a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to

say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or against America. The following three items were decided at an Imperial Council in Tokyo in June 1941:

- (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War.
- (2) To prepare for the operations in the South.
- (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders.

But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia by continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the "Kan-Toku-En" plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to the Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General LIMEZU gave individually to each army commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time armies. I received the following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hailar and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to me the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening the war. I was only instructed to maintain the positions in Hailar for a long period of time.

In accordance with the duty given me, I reinforced the fortifications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hailar and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and food supplies for six months near Hailar. In June 1942 at Chichihachin, when the Second Area Army, to which the 6th Army belonged, was set up, its Commander Lt. General ANAMI Korechika explained to me the object of establishing the Second Area Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in the Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by the secret name as plan "B" (Otsu"), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters. Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Army from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "No. B". Lt. General ANAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offense at the third stage of the operations, I should make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained the strategic plan which should be followed by main force of the Second Area Army at the second stage. The details will be given later. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carried out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "B". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by the former Commander of the First Area Army General YAMASHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to me. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army, in Mukden.

Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of the First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army based on Plan "B". Under this plan the following measures were to be taken.

Preparatory Measures

Heihe District:- In the peace time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and N Army were to be set up at Tsitsikar and Heiko respectively. N Army seemed to be changed to 8th Army later. This formation was to be made by diverting four divisions from China and Japan. Consequently the Second Area Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Heiko and one division under the direct control of the Area Army. Besides, the 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of the 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (about one division strong) should be increased by the addition of another division after the outbreak of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future.

Maritime Province District:- Those stationed in peace time in this district were three divisions of the 5th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Hunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu--eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters was established at Tsinling and to that army was given one division each from the 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area Army Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of the 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under the direct control of the First Area Army. In addition there was one air force army under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on the Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B".

Offensive Plan:- In accordance with the offensive Plan "B" we expected to seize the entire Far East as far as Baikal in four successive steps. In the first step the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on the Russian border near Sunwu and Heiko, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. No actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army was expected to be fettered within that area. Should the Red Army start an offensive it must be checked. The 6th Army should maintain its positions at Hailor and Arshan.

In case an attack was made by the Red Army from Chita via Manchuria it must be checked by keeping these positions firm. In this case, the 1st Area Army in the Maritime Province District would act decisively on the offensive according to the following plan:-

(a) The 5th Army shall advance from Kuling with 3 divisions and 1 tank division and occupy Iman, and, while securing Iman to the North with a portion of its force, the main force shall march southward to join the battle to be fought by the main force of the First Area Army near Voroshilov.

(b) Two divisions of the 2nd Army shall advance from Hunchung break through the border; proceed North through the Nunn District toward Voroshilov. Its action shall be in concert with the main force of the Area Army.

(c) Five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army shall go south toward Voroshilov, passing the south-west side of Lake Hsingkoi.

(d) Three divisions of the 3rd Army shall advance from Tunkming to ~~nerdeko~~ kovo and join the area army's main force there. All these forces were to press the Red Army at Voroshilov, and part of them, after seizing Voroshilov, were to cooperate with the Japanese Navy at Yuanshan to capture Vladivostok by envelopment. This was to end the first stage. Its chief object was to secure Japan proper and the industrial areas of Manchuria from the Red Army's air raids from the Maritime Province district, by entirely occupying the district.

Second Stage:- In case the first stage of the offensive was successful, the main force of the First Area Army was to advance Northward toward Habarovsk along the railroad, leaving part of the Army in the Maritime Province to maintain the occupied area. The division stationed at Chiamusu would occupy the positions facing Leninsk to protect the wings of the First and Second Armies in the vicinity. At this time the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army would cooperate with the First Area Army and commence an offensive operation from Heike and its vicinity; cross the Amur; seize Blagoveshchensk Kuibishevka and Svobodny and cut off the Siberian Railway. One part of the forces were to defend the West and the main force was to move eastward along the railway line to Habarovsk. Then the First and the Second Area Armies were to cooperate in attacking in a decisive battle the Red Army from both sides and occupy Khabarovsk. This was to complete the second stage.

Third Stage:- After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Second Area Army would immediately turn westward to make preparations for the reinforcements necessary for the future offensive operations upon the Zabaikalye. At this time the 6th Army at Hailar was to be reinforced raising its strength to four divisions which were to prepare to advance the attack. In the Maritime Province the First Area Army was to secure the important districts and the rear of the Second Area Army. The main force of the Second Area Army would turn West after completing preparations and commence the advance to Chita along the railway.

As soon as the Second Area Army's main force reached Mogacha, the 6th Army was immediately to start the attack by breaking through the border near Sanho and Manchuria. And the 6th Army was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Army's main force and advance to Chita and its southern area. On seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Second Area Army was to secure important districts in the West; and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close.

In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as Lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage.

Operations Regarding Outer Mongolia: - In the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Army, the Arhshan Detachment (approximately one division) was to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in Manchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chita from Arhshan via Tampsakbulak, Baintumen and Ulan-Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the Imperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Ulan-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1944. Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia War, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature.

General Kita Seichi
Ex-Commander of the First Area Army
Kwantung Army

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Derevyankin

Interpreter: Shchebenkov

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify
that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese
prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written by him in Japanese on
April 20-23

was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the
U.S.S.R.

on or about June 27, 1946, and that the original of the said
document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the
Khabarovsk Region.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 26, 1946.

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Ex. 835

No. 1

自筆宣言
俘虜當別關東軍第一方面軍司令官大將
喜多誠一
自四月二十日
至四月二十三日一九四六年
日私前關東軍第一方面軍司令官喜多誠一大將、
日本、滿洲獲得準備久々對外政勢ニテ陣述入
昭和初頭一九二六年支那ニ於内乱擴大此内
孫文等將介石軍、北伐ヨリ起リタヒ七二三年支那五
民、統一及支那之權回収、目的ヲ以テ行ハシタル七十年
此運動滿州ニ波及入此時は日本、權利ニ權着入
ルノ以テ日本政府次、政治方針ヲ決定セリ

之滿州支那内亂ヲ進入セヌ
之孫文勢力、滿洲渗透ヲ防止ス
之滿州ニ於ケル張作霖、政權ヲ極力支持ニ彼、
之基督教徒、主民自由運動ヲ滿洲ニ進入セ
サニ様努力ニ又滿洲自体ニ於ケル排日氣氛
ヲ制圧スルヲ要セリ
皆本政治方針ハ陸海大臣外務大臣と共に策定ニ由
中總理大臣ニテ決裁セリ自命一九二七年陸軍省ニ於
于此決定ニ關ニテ書類ヲ見タ、當時陸軍大臣ハ宇
垣大將也

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

No.2

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一九三八年五月北支ニ於ケル國民黨軍ハ張作霖
ハ抵杭ヲ柳庄ニ滿洲ニ駆逐セリ國民黨運動
ハ滿洲ニ進入セサリモ滿洲ニ於ケル抗日氣氛、
遂次激化セリ斯ガル支那及滿洲、情況、下ニ
和一九三九年八月參謀總長金谷大將、命ニヨ
リ南京大使館附武官輔佐官ニ任ヤテ上海ニ駐
在セし大使館附武官佐藤少將ニ附属スルコトナ
レ。松支那、情況支那、國民性風俗及支那語
ヲヨク研究シ又南京政府ニ於ケル軍政要人中ニ知
今有セラ以テ此職ニ任セラル七十リ例ハ軍
政部長何應欽大將ハ一九二七年南京日本領事
館ニ勤務セル彼友人ニヨリ鎮江ニ於ケル會見セリ
其時日本陸軍省支那ニ於ケル南京事件日本居
留民、南京領事館ニ避難ニ國民黨軍ハ之襲撃
セリ、狀態ヲ調査ノ爲私ヲ派遣セリ其時
私ハ國民黨軍、北伐、狀況ヲ諒知スル目的ヲ以
テ鎮江ニ赴ケリ茲ニ此方面ニ於ケル國民黨軍最高
指揮官名ハ何應欽ト知人ナリ何應欽ハ

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前二日本工官学校三留学三日本人二討三親切ナリ
是以外二私八南京政府軍政部次長陳儀訓練總監
周至衡中將軍測量局長莫松中將、工兵司令楊
森中將上能ノ友叶關係ニ在リ私八上記支那將軍ト
東京陸大共三在学セリ最初ヨリ彼等上友人ナリ私ヲ大
使館附武官輔佐官二任命セル時八上記條件外支那
ニ於ニ日本政黨討之自分意見考慮セラ私勿論
此政策二討レ整成者ナリ南京密賄前二私八參謀總長
金春大將ヨリ次訓令予蒙フ

1. 南京 政府軍監督ヲ了諒知スシ
2. 民主三ヨリ起レ民自由運動ニテ資料ヲ蒐集
三特ニ滿洲ニ於ニ此運動、極大、傾向ニ注意ニシテ
滿洲ニ波及セリ尤如ノ如ノ努力スシ
3. 業務遂行ニ容易ナラムニ以寧南京政府、軍人等ト
連絡支叶關係ヲ結フニ是等訓令八上海大使
附武官輔佐官ヨリ同様受ケ此外私八南京ニ派
遣、時南京政府、軍事政治、秘密ニ注意スシ下
指示セリ私八南京到着後、記南京政府、軍事
局署ト連絡ヲ遂ニ又受ケタル訓令ニ基キ自己業
務ヲ實行セリ是以外ニ軍事政治、諜報ヲ担任
セリ此任務八南京政府、要人ト連絡又謀者、利
用ヨリ遂行セリ當時支那情況、諜報勤務
ノ學習易ナリト云ア得ス即テ支那ニ於ニ社
会内亦二派リ子命立支那軍閥、討立又政府

110.

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反對、會事了り于吾又、如何小諭報上、要取之七章成
否不得久而三上記條件、十二南京政府軍事局、
關係公署于宣好二十世二成功ヲル十七年時滿洲ニ於レ
情況八九月運動臺北總工事件ノ起也、
一九三年滿洲事變、稍前解安領、或一二道路
索倫附近ニ於日本中村大尉力殺害セラシテ、中村
大尉ハ參謀本部參謀ナリ、參謀本部ハ彼ヲ興安
嶺附近諜報任務ヲ以テ派遣セリ、中村大尉ハ興安
嶺、首腦調査目的ヲ以テ派遣セリ、十二付秋ハ一九三二年
關東軍司令部第一課長トニ着任候、關東軍司令
部、勤務者多數ヨリ聞知セリ、又是ハ宣勝十九年十二月自
今モ確信シテ、日本、滿洲を獲得不、惟滿洲ニ于
ハ私次、如ク云アラ得ヘシ、日本ハ從未ヨリ滿洲ニ付
希望ヲ有セバ、滿洲事變前、狀態其他種々事態
ヨリ證明セル、日本ハ自己、討蘇攻勢計畫遂行爲
滿洲ニ於レ軍事地盤ヲ保有スルヲ欲セリ、朝鮮ニ於
ケル戰略鐵道建設例ハ、京城、圖們、綿圖、伊羅津
羅南綿又釜山奉天線、建設ハ云々迄未シ、一、目
的ヲ追アセリ、此問題ヲ解決石山海ニ適當十七歷史的
時間を遡サリカス、一九三年ハ恰度適時ア
リ、即テ滿洲討之關係下、他公例ハ支那内乱ニ
カヒ蘇聯五年計畫ヨリテ、内連謀ニ惹カシアリ時
ナリ、是等考慮三日本ハ一九三年九月十八日滿洲出征
ヲ極大之全滿ノ獲得アリ、結果トナリ、

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滿洲獲得ニ經ニ日本ハ滿洲小組織ニ着手セリニ、是
見下、乃ニ滿洲ヲ支那政權、下ニ豈キ滿洲政權ニ著
于日本顧問ヲハシヒテ然ニ閩東軍司令部ニ勤務入ル
石原重佐板垣大佐、主張ヨリ荒木大將公之ヲ支持ニ寧
政滿洲独立ニ樹立ニ其宗權ヲ日本ニ於テ祀羅不外様
組織セリ之ニカ尊各大臣ヲ滿人ニ次長、日本人ヲ任命ニ又
官衙内ニ日本人官吏一人也此コトヲ決定セリ斯カラ政策ノ入
一層ニ滿人中ニ抗日運動、氣氛ヲ嶺セリ是ニ滿洲ニ於
ナ日本軍ニ討ニ抗日ニ活動ニアビ反杭軍、松太、原因ニ
爲セ、閩東軍ハ是ニ開聯ニ滿洲ニ於ケル抗日分子ヲ討
伐ニヨリ糧草湯ニ他方ニ於ニ宣傳ニヨリ根等ニ歸順ヲ勦
ルコトヲカ、任務セリ是等、主ニ討伐ハ哈爾賓錦州、
東遼道附近ニ行ハシム、山東奉天軍、追擊鐵河討伐
等ナリ是等、討伐ハ閩東軍司令官本庄大將、武勝大將
、時參謀長三宅中將、小磯中將ニヨリ行ハシム、是等、
討伐作戦ハ無事、滿人住民二大ナル損害破産ヲ與ヘタ、
即ニ討伐ハ住民、離散住家焼却財產、喪失等ノ伴
コトヲ明ラカニ認メサルカニス、私ハ長年月ヲ経過セル度
討伐ニヨリ住民ニ果テ化粧柱、數量上観國ヲ記憶セズ也
然レ七年四月駿華ニヨリ大ナリ犠牲ヲ零一乞コトヲ認ナ
シカフス、松井ニ謀長トニ閩東軍司令部ニ在職
間、是等討伐、實量及計畫ハ閩東軍司令部ニ於ニ
有藤大佐及遠藤中佐ニ於ニ策定セリ、是ニ討伐隊ヲ直
接指揮セルモノ次、如ニ。

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110

滿洲獲得二從に日本、滿洲、組織三着手セリ云々意
見下す。第一滿洲支那政權、下ニ豈ナ滿洲政權二者
于日本顧問ヲハル此要矣。然ニ關東軍司令部ニ勤務不仕
石原軍佐板垣大佐、主張ヨリ荒木大將へ之ヲ支持之事
政滿洲獨立ニ樹立ニ要實權ヲ日本ニ於テ把握ス様
組織セリ之カ等各大庄ヲ滿人ニ次長日本人ヲ任命之文
官衙内言日本人官吏一人ヒコトヲ決定セリ斯カル政策ノ入
一層ニ滿人中一粒目運動、氣氛ヲ熾セリ是ヘ滿洲ニ於
ナ日本軍ニ對ニ抗日二活動ニ下此反杭軍、松太原因ニ
爲セ、關東軍ハ是ニ關聯ニ滿洲ニ於テハ日分子ヲ討
伐ヨリ撃蕩ニ他方ニ於テ宣傳ヨリ被等ニ歸順シ勤ム
ルコトヲサヘ、任務上セリ是等、主下ニ討伐ハ哈爾濱錦州
東邊道附近二行ハ又西昌山外李杜軍、追擊凱旋討伐
等十、是等、討伐ハ關東軍司令官本庄大將、武勝大將
時參謀長三宅中將、小磯中將ニヨリ行ハタク、是等、
討伐作戰ハ無事、滿人住民三六十損害破産ヲ無ヘタ
即ニ討伐ハ住民、離散住家、燒却財產、喪失等ヲ伴
コト明ラカニ認サルカニ私心長年日ヲ経過セリ是等
討伐ヨリ住民ニ共ニ化粧程、數量上範圍ヲ記憶セリ也
然レ七年四月關寧ニヨリ太ナリ犠牲ヲ與ニ化コトヲ認ナス
シカラス、私亦ニ謀長トニ關東軍司令部ニ在職
間、是等討伐、實是及計画ハ關東軍司令部ニ於テ
有藤大佐及遠藤中佐ニ於テ策定セリ、參ニ討伐隊ヲ直
接指揮セラモ、次如ニ。

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10. 6

一、 哈爾濱及吉林附近 方十師團(長瀬源中將)
二、 錦州附近松河 方八師團(長西中將)
三、 黑龍江省哈爾濱附近 方十四師團(長松
本甲將徐相俊中將)
四、 松河附近 方六師團(長林本中將)
混成旅團(參謀部少將)
上記師團の一部、他方面に於て同時討伐を行
松河討伐(關東軍司令官武藏大將)直轄指揮せり
松毛松河討伐三参加人松日軍、行動動靜及松日軍
令參謀官化任民、區域等圖示譜報資料ヲ私小字二
謀長(子)關東軍參謀長(子)提出(是子某子)關東軍
司令部第一課(子)討伐(參謀作戰)策定也(一九三四年春佳木斯南方七龍附近)於子大十七討伐會議並行
行(タリ)是日本、滿洲本體會社(子)兩人、土地(子)實收(子
名)三打(子)附近、滿洲部隊(子)反亂暴動(日本、中國子
鐵道之)之(子)長飯塚大佐(子)殺(タリ)子是討伐
三(タリ)七十、土龍山附近暴動(是日本)日本軍
六十(子)部隊(子)派遣(自己)、解隊長飯塚大佐(子)策定
ヨリ復仇(意味)加(子)滿人住民(大十九)損害(子)舉
タリ此作戰(方十師團)參謀(參謀長加納大
佐(子)実施セラル(一九三一年ヨリ一九三六年迄滿洲)於
子(關東軍)子(行)化全般、討伐(東北)以期向
子(關東軍)司令官(日本)大將(武藏大將)委任
大將(南洋總大將)在(子)

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Doc

07

100

同時二五三年三月日本公東支鐵道、經當、二十日
聯、勢力ヲ滿洲ニ運送し、多額軍事費也。此日
約二千日本兵鉄道兵其職員二打、一千名機、壓迫于加入
者、是軍工作六千人三千名的軍特務機關長山松原少
將、今嶺寧寧海餘代表了營理事及其它機關三ヨリ
行、一七〇、此工作（開新軍司令部）有二課長原田大佐
！指揮下三行一！滿洲ニ於レテ蘇聯勢力ヲ扼逐
在也爲二日本公東支鐵道之機械専修團、二十日鉄
道、經當二村之防害並二鐵道職員二打之壓迫于行、
日本公鐵幹利用于北、南、西、東、各國之鐵路化了、然
三當時（情況）（軍人錢糧）三十万金滿、鐵道、經當公鐵
賊三、妨害也、下四十一九三五年日本公鐵工事段、
立了蘇聯、二十日本鉄道、機車、電却、二至三メタリ
莫娘日本公滿洲ニ於レテ蘇聯作戰、軍事地盤準備ヲ
重次根本也、滿洲、把艦準備シテ日本八十炮三要
塞、橋梁三大小三百、能打場、設置三九千呎米、鉄道于
敷設三鐵律、鐵公架港、通信意路、蘇聯軍需工場、設
置其他建設也、是等、建設大致日本政府參謀
本部、陸軍省秘局、計画三事半實施セリ、是等、計画
參謀本部、權不甚十自己、要來セラ、象子遂行ノル
事、二國軍人次、如々也！

1. 要塞構造、海軍機部

2. 飛行場構造、空能行部隊

3. 作鐵道建設、滿洲土木工程局

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同時二五三三年三月日本小東天銅道、鑄造、三丁目
聯、勢力ヲ滿洲ニ延長シ、實業團子開拓セリ此日
約三千七百支銃道及其鐵道二千九百種、壓迫ノ加八
月、是年、工作小主三千三百零四萬圓、總經理會及其他機關三ヨリ
得失金額實業團子開拓會理會及其他機關三ヨリ
行ハシテ、此工作（關東軍司令部）三課長原田直
！指揮下三行一、滿洲ニ於ナニ跡聯勢力ヲ延長
在也爲二日本小東天銅道二實業團子開拓會三千九百
道、鑄造、三丁目二四萬亞二餘三鐵道二千九百種、
一千日本小連紙利利用三千九百兩之款、否認化三千九百
三少時、情況（事）人錢者、三千九百兩、鐵道、經營人連
賊（事）妨害セラレトナ一九三五年日本凡工本手段、
盡了工務所于東天銅道、鐵道、會却乙七至アメ多
莫娘日本小滿洲ニ於ナニ跡作料、官事地盤準備ヲ
運次根木セリ、滿洲、地盤準備ニシテ日本八十地區ニ要
學于構築三太、言、能行場所設置三千九百米、銅道于
敷設三鐵津浦、北滿洲港、通信道路、鐵道、軍需工場、設
置車輛、建設已、是年、建設、大取、日本政府參謀
本取、陸軍省、海軍、計画、基本實施セリ、是年、計画及
參謀本部、指不ニ基十自己、要未セ、事ノ遂行久化
爲三國軍人、次、即乞セリ

1、要塞構築、為軍械部

2、能行場構築、為能行部隊

3、工作道、路、鐵道、為滿洲工程局

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4. 通信設置、馬洲庄會社
5. 馬洲港入港道、建設、滿洲本
6. 庫滿交易、設置及經營為滿洲實業株式會
社、設置及

日本當局、是舉事構成及日本移民、為強制徵用、以
滿人土地、買收、又彼等、別地移住也、滿人太甚不滿、
稻田、此外、僅事構成、作業、為活動力、強制制度作
之、滿人、徵用、此活動為徵用、自由活動、比之率七、
徵金、拿去、滿人、滿社、苦痛、與、他方面於、后
往、該及衛生、營養、狀況及日本管理、不食等、引、方
面、多數病死者、出生、例、一九四四年、安嶺
附近、寧東溝、滿人勞動者約三萬、今、作業、其
死亡率、五百名、達、死、於、死者、前、寧東庫
總參謀長、參謀、及、將、自、該、明、事、之、
一九四五年、於、寧東庫、強制徵用、滿人勞動者、三万
一千三百、迄、至、

一九三一年、滿洲事變、全期間、百、滿洲、對蘇軍事
基、強化、為、行、此、處置、責任者、日本乃、國、太、急、嚴、
近衛、東條、大將、日本陸軍、近衛、木大將、杉山、大將、東條、大
將、參謀總長、金谷、大將、關院宮、杉山、大將、東條、大將、南
洋、軍、官、本庄、大將、麥列、大將、南、大將、植田、大將、梅津、大
將、其他、本、証言、記述、也、寧東庫司令部、勤務者、
私、一九三四、年、八、月、參謀本部、支那、謀長、上、轉、往、者、時、
總長、關院宮、次長、杉山、大將、後、大將、某、一部、長、金、木、
將、傳、大將、某、二、部、長、樺谷、大將、後、中、將、某、三、部、長、後、

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4. 通信施設、馬關洲廳會社
 5. 軍港入朕道、建設、滿族本
 6. 庫浦五場、設置及經官為滿洲工業株式會社、設置
- 日本当局、是等事件及日本移民、為強制的償價、以
滿人土地、貢役、又彼等別地移住他處、滿人太甚不滿
招、此外庫華梅樂工作業者、活動力、強制制度作
滿人、徵用、此活動者徵用、自由活動、比之每年九
億金、原々滿人、滿社、苦痛、與、^ノ他方面於、居
往被設及衛生給養、狀況及日本管理、不實事、^ニ方
勸者中、多數病死者、生、^ノ例、一九四四年、寧安鐵
附近、寧東鐵路、滿人勞動者約二萬人、工作業者
死亡率、五百石、童、^ノ但、^ノ於、死、有、^{アリ}前、東庫
總參謀長、奉、將、及、總、官、大將、自、令、説明、^ノ、事、^ニサ
一九四五年、於、東庫軍、強制徵用、滿人勞動者、三万
一千三百石、童、^ノ
- 一九三一年滿洲事變、未全期間、百、滿洲、社、蘇、建、事
其他強化、為、行、多、處置、責任者、日本內閣大臣、
近衛、東條、大臣、日本陸軍、大臣、杉山、大臣、東條、大
將、參謀總長、金谷、大將、關、辰、宮、杉、山、大將、東條、大將、東
庫司令官、本庄、石、將、芳、川、大將、南、大將、植、田、大將、梅、津、大
將、其他本、証言記述、東庫司令部、勤務者、⁺
私、一九三四、八月、參謀本部、支那、謀、長、ト、主、轉、任、當時、
總長、關、辰、宮、大將、杉、山、大將、後、大將、軍、一部、長、今木、大
將、傳、寺、將、軍、部、長、磯、谷、大將、後、中、村、大將、軍、三、部、長、後、

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4. 通信施設、馬來洲度會社
5. 马來人胰島、建設、滿胰本。
6. 庫爾吉場、設置及經官為馬來度工業株式會社、設置

日本当局、是事事轉於日本殖民者強制的信價、只
滿人土地、貢收、又彼等割地、移住、滿人大臣不滿
招、此外庫華機械工作業為活動力、強制制度作
滿人徵拂、此活動有徵用、自由活動、比之率十九
續金、僑民、滿人、滿社、苦痛、與、他方面於、居
往被設及衛生、營養、狀況及日本管理、不食事、
方、活動中、多數病死有、生、例、一九四四年、寧安嶺
附近、寧安嶺、滿人勞動者約三百人、下、滿人
死亡率、五百名、童、但、面、於、死者、前、庫總
參謀長、大將、及、總官大將、自、該、明、事、之、廿
一、一九四五年、於、庫軍、強制徵用、滿人勞動者、三万
一千三百、童。

一九三一年滿洲事變、滿全期間、百、滿洲、社蘇庫軍
其他強化、為、行、多處、置、責任者、日本內閣大臣、
近衛、東條、大將、日本、庫大將、東條、大將、杉山、大將、東條、大
將、參謀總長、金谷、大將、關、宮、杉、山、大將、東條、大將、宮
庫司令官、本庄、大將、芳川、大將、南、大將、植田、大將、梅津、大
將、其他本、証言記述、同、庫司令部、勤務者、
私、一九三四、年、八月、參謀本部、支那、參謀長、ト、事、時、
總長、同、候、宮、大將、杉、山、大將、後、大將、昇、一部、長、於、木、
將、傳、大將、昇、御、長、職、合、大將、傳、中、升、主、計、長、後、

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支那内政干涉ニ至ラメタ
支那大使館附武官時代私一九三六年四月支那大使館附
武官ニ任命セテ上海ニ着任セリ是ヨリ大東京府ニ於テ
自支那併呂裏化ニアニ鑑ニ外務省ハ新タリ川越大使
ヲ支那ニ任命セリ川越大使、解決ノキ問題、内容、次
如ニ
1. 支那、滿洲ニ於ケル日本、權利、黙認スシ即チ支那、
日本、滿洲ノ獲得、乞ヒコト見テ振リテス
2. 支那、抗日侮日ヲ禁制スヘシ日支兩國、經濟
提携合作ニ進ム
3. 支那、日本ニ防共協力ス
以上、三條件、代償トニテ日本、支那ニ經濟船技術
の援助ヲナスアリト記憶ス而ニテ一九三六年六月
川越大使、此問題ニウキ南京政府ト交渉、開始
シテ南京政府、同意セサリシテ以テ交渉停止
トナリ、南京政府、日本、提出條件ニ對シ次也
ク答ナリ
1. 支那、公然ト滿洲國ヲ認、サルト滿洲ニ於ケル現
狀、是ヲ黙認ス
2. 支那、自體、共産思想、反対、具體的
於云々第八路軍、對し反抗、了ルモ他方面ニ
於テ對蘇外文上關係、恐心、恐心、ル以テ日本、
防共協力ヲ約束スルコト、出来ス
3. 支那政府、支那ニ於ケル抗日運動、自己、
力、テ表示、能スル是レ個人、氣分ニテス

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中支那國民全般之感情以下ナリ
南京政府改憲是を最後迄持ナル以一九三七年日本軍又早開始タ根源ナセリ和、上海大使館附武官上丁去參前參謀次長西尾中將訓令ニ定ナリ、其行谷會長次、如「南京政府對外運動向待、軍事本源ニ關之晴報ヲ萬集之、共二川越大使、兩國國文調整ニ關シ協力ス」
松山時、兩京二越、川越大使、會見也。然乍、支那關係情勢、逐段陳述ナリ一九三六年六月、北京郊外於日本駐屯部隊、一個演習を行ヒ、降支那人ハ之ヲ実施セラ、事變肇生也。
日本之現地、於解消ノト努力シテ成功ス。至る後、日本之蔣介石政權ヲ本領認シ、支那軍ヲ唐總帥ヒト進攻スルト、新開外交大臣兼軍事代表也。一九三七年八月、上海附近、於日本陸戰隊（海軍）・支那軍、衝突又是日支戰、遂激擴大也。次、段階ナリ。
特務部長及陸軍院、陸軍部長、當時、一九三七年八月、支那軍、擴大、際、其方面軍ヲ大常設設置セラ、二件セ松、乃而通軍、特務部長任命セヒ、北京ニ署任ス。松、陸軍大臣杉山太將軍任命セラ、特務部軍政事務ヲ實施シ直接任務、下野、並、中國日本代表在任、即チ政治

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- 經濟文代及政治、指導機關、ハ政權ヲ樹立ス
私、特務部、組織ニ次、局ヲ設ケタリ
1. 總務局 政治問題關係ス
 2. 第一經濟局 金融經濟二關係ス
 3. 第二經濟局 交通產業二關係ス
 4. 文化局 教育文化二關係ス

當時支那、五領地主於ケル政治經濟、運営計画、策定、海、日本政府各省ヨリ特務部事務官派遣セリ、私、特務部長、時ヒ支ニ於ケル重要事務處置、其ノ親日家王克敏、首班下、行政機関立之ヲルコト、彼ハ從來財政大臣、經歷ヲ有セラセ何、政時代リヤ私、記憶セズ王克敏政權於ケル傾向シテ日本代表ヲ入タリ此傾向、政治問題ニキ、自今ナ直接指者セリ經濟顧問平正金三郎、行政顧問湯澤三牛男、法政顧問大島茂蔵、三井後藤、三井重人ヲアヘ、顧問原則ハ王克敏政権、活動及行動ニ於ケル日本政府政策ニ實行又全力ヲ盡シテ抗戰ニ於ケル日本軍ニ協力、瓦元幸特務部、解散、特務部、職務、新タニ組織シテ、監理院三移り又興亞院、北支運輸部長也、私ヲ任命セリ、私ハ此後内閣ヲ蒙キタリ當時、總理、平沼、リ興亞軍、樹、非ガヨリ私、文官ニ移、名を現役ニ列スルコトナリ、又興亞院委員キキ興亞院中央部、東洋部、平沼總理院頭首ニテ興亞院總裁ナリ副總裁達、章太佐、板垣中將、酒澤太企外務大臣、大藏大臣、興亞院委員、約六十名ナリ、實際、仕事、總裁之ヲ行ハズ、テ興亞院、孫裕良官柳川平助之ヲ実施入成興亞院、社會團體等

非ラス納国家轉肉タルニヨリ文官及軍人ニ於テモ委員トナリコト
ヲ得、上述一如興亞院ノ計画的任務ハ自今か一九四〇年迄連
絡設置官タリシ間ハ支那ヲ日本化スルニ在リ私ハ大東亞ノ
組織入ッタル他國ニ此計画ハ良ダケルコトヨク承知ス。

然シ後三日米戰爭開始、時日本公東亞ニ於テ他ヨリ占領ミタル
時例ハビルマ、泰、佛印、島其他南太平洋、島ヲ占領ミタル
時興亞院ノ如キ活動、範圍ハ大ニ拡大セリテ以テ支那ノミナラヌ
大東亞ニ於テ占領地区ニ興亞院ノ計画的任務ヲ遂行スレモノ
興亞院ニ基キ最大又強化セル組織ヲ草示スルニ至レリ、斯
クミテ一九四二年当初興亞院ハ新設大東亞省ニ編入セリス興亞
院、連絡設置官ノ勤務ハ各占領地ニ於テ設置セラシタル大使
使館ニ移管セリ例ハ滿洲ニ於テル特命全權大使閏東軍
司令官山田大將支那ニ於テ汪精衛政權ニ対ニテ同様ナレ
大使否、又ビルマ、泰、佛印及日本ノ占領ニタル他ヨリ占領
大使館アリキ、是等ノ大使館ハ元ノ興亞院ノ計画的任
務ヲ遂行セラレタリ即チ日本ニ於テ占領ニタル領土ヲ日本
化セリ。私ハ北支ニ於テ特務部長及連絡部長官時代ニ
在リテハ北支軍ノ作戦行動ノ適當ナル状態ヲ確保セムル爲
並ニ滿洲軍事地盤強化援助ノ爲大ナレ仕事ヲ行ヘリ

一九三七年夏北支方面軍ノ行動ニ伴ヒ張家口ニ於テ内蒙
駐屯軍ヲ設置セラル一九三七年八月閏東軍ノ參謀長東
條中將（後大將）指揮下ニ内蒙ヲ占領ミ茲ニ於テ特務
機関ヲ設置ミ松井少將ヲ任命ニタリ後駐蒙軍設置
(司令官蓮沼中將)、除ハ特務機関ハ特務部ニ更生シ
松井少將ハ其儘長トナレリ、一九三七年十一月頃松井少

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將ハ德王ヲ首班トスル日本の蒙疆政府ヲ樹立セリ此政府
ニ滿洲ヨリ來名ル日本人顧問ノ人タメ内蒙古占領及日本
的政府樹立目的ハ滿洲ヲ獲得也時上同様目的を達
ヒ即内蒙古日本掌握此領土ニ於テ对外蒙軍事基地
ヲ作ム上又三在リ是、廢置當時蒙軍參謀長東條
中將、主張ヨリ行仁タリ東條中將ハ日本總理大臣
上ナレルモ比方針ヲ締結セリ。内蒙古獲得ニシテ二行ハシタ
ル慶豐ニ於テ自命救援助、北支ニ於テ北支方面軍支那軍ヲ支那
及内蒙古驅逐ニシテ、條件ヲ作リ以テ東條中將、蒙古占领
ヲ容易ナルムニ現ヘタリ。日本内蒙古於テ資源不足為
滿洲ニ於ルカ如ノ要塞構築ノ慶豐ヤリシモ一九四一年迄内
蒙五万兵力ヲ有セリ。一九三八年張鼓峯一九三九年ノモン
ハ之境紛爭問題ニ關ニテ日本軍不法行動ヨリ日蘇西
軍南戦トナリセシモ其事件、經過及責任者ニ詳細
承知セラレアルヲ以テ和議ニ行キ新ニ答釋ヲ有セス
一九四〇年三月私ハ興亞院連絡部長官ヨリ召還セラレ
宇都宮(日本)ニアル才十四師團長ニ任命セラタリ。私ハ
一九四〇年九月參謀總長興院官ヨリ計画ニ基干關東軍
八十五師團迄增加スヘオフ以テ才十四師團ハ滿洲ニ轉用
セラルハ十日内示ヲ受ケク
私ハ一九四〇年十月師團上共ニ齊々哈爾列着入
關東軍、此增加ハ滿洲秩序ヲ防衛化爲斯刃數量
兵力ヲ要セサル以テ日本、對蘇作戰準備ナリ

Doc 246?

將ハ德王ヲ首班入ル日本の家疆政府樹立セリ此政府
ニ滿洲ヨリ來タル日本人顧問ノ人シタリ内蒙ガ占領及日本
的政局樹立目的ハ滿洲ヲ獲得也時上同様目的を追
ヒ即内蒙ヲ日本掌握此領土於外蒙軍事基地
ヲ作ムトスル在リ是、夏豐六當時關東軍參謀長東
條中將、主張ヨリ行仁タリ東條中將ハ日本總理大臣
トナヒモ比方針ヲ継続セリ内蒙ヲ獲得又其二行仁タ
ル夏豐六於自分、援助ハ茲ニ於北支方面軍支那軍支那
及内蒙ヨリ驅逐スル事、條件ヲ作リ以テ東條中將、蒙古占领
ヲ容易ナフムル三現ヘタリ。日本内蒙ニ於テ之資產不足焉
滿洲ニ於ル力如ノ要塞構築ノ實質ニヤリミモ一九四一年迄内
蒙五万、兵力ヲ有セリ 一九三八年張鼓峯一九三九年ノモノ
ハ之境紛爭問題ニ關ニハ日本軍不法行動ヨリ日鮮面
軍團敗トナヒセリ予其事件、經過及責任者ニシテ詳細
承和セラレアルヲサムシ前ノ行進新ノ答辯ヲ有セス
一九四〇年三月私ハ興亞院連絡部長官ヨリ召還セラレ
宇都宮(日本)ニアリ才十四師團長ニ仕ラレタリ。私ハ
一九四〇年九月參謀總長閑院宮ヨリ計画ニ基干關東軍
八十五師團迄增加スハナリ以テ才十四師團ハ滿洲ニ轉用
セラルハ十日内示ヲ受ケクリ

私ハ一九四〇年十月即團上共ニ齊々哈爾三到着入
關東軍、此增加ハ滿內秩序ヲ防衛スル爲斯カニ數量
兵力ヲ要セサル以テ日本、對蘇作戰準備ナリ

一九四〇年 駆團上共二有各哈爾濱空時 自分判断

以外二半六軍司令官ヲ才十四師團八開戰場合
ハハラル平地使用スハキテ以テ駆團ノ將校ハ海陸附近
地形ニ精通スハ要人又教育ハ裝備優良ナル蘇軍ニ
對スル持久防禦系ニ重點ヲ置キ訓練スハ半日、秘密訓令ヲ
受クノリ。尚ハハラル才六軍司令部ニ於テ一九四〇年二月
二十五八個師團附近、圖工戰術演習ヲ実施シ對蘇作戰研究
セリ。私及駆團、參謀八是ニ參加セリ。松八野蘇戰闘ニ
重點ヲ置キ節下ヲ訓練セリ。

一九四一年 独蘇開戰後參謀本部ハ對蘇作戰準備強化
ノ為日本ヨリ人馬及砲ヲ送リ閩東軍二大増強ヲ行ヒタ
此增加ハ開演、稱呼アシ計画ニ基シ実施セリ。

一九四二年夏此計画ニ基シ閩東軍、兵數及兵器ハ最高迄
達セリ。才一從未十三師團アリシ日本ヨリ新タニ二師團ヲ送リ。
此外各師團八人員五〇〇馬三五〇ヲ增加セリ以テ閩東軍八

開特演前二

15

十三師團 人 一九五〇〇

戰車二師團 人 三〇〇〇 戰車四〇〇

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| | | | | |
|-------|---------|-------|-------|-----|
| 飛行軍 | 人 | 二四〇〇 | 飛行機 | 一〇〇 |
| 國境守備隊 | (三八六大隊) | 人一九六〇 | | |
| 鉄道守備隊 | 一五 | 隊 | 人一七五〇 | |
| 後方部隊 | 人 | 一〇〇〇 | | |
| 計 | 人 | 三八六〇 | | |
| | 馬 | 四〇〇〇 | | |

ナリシカ開演、討画三ヨリ行ハタク増加後関東軍八
人六〇〇〇。馬八〇〇〇ヲ有ス(ニ至シ)。

砲團三八八門、指揮シアリ才十四師團三於開演討画
三基キ行ハタク増加前三十六門増加後四十八門ナリ。

他、師團モ同様ニ増加之タルコトヲ考慮シ得ハシ。

関東軍増加、際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ
命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス関東軍、勤務者ヨリ聞キタルミナラ

以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私才十四師團、属ス才六軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ命令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ發シアラス。

然シ才六軍司令官ハ海陸兩三在化才十三師團ヲ指揮シ

遂カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海陸兩東方高地ニ築城

2467

飛行軍 人 二四〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇

國境守備隊（三八六隊）人一九六〇。

鉄道守備隊（五隊）人一七五〇。

後方部隊 人 一〇〇〇

計 人 三八六〇

馬 四〇〇〇

ナリシカ開演、計画三ヨリ行ハシタル増加後関東軍、
人六〇〇〇。馬八〇〇〇ヲ有ス（二至三）。

砲團ノハ和、指揮ノアリシ才十四師團ニ於テ開演計画
三基を行ハシタル増加前三十六門、増加後四十八門ナリ。

他、師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘン。

関東軍増加、際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ

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以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私才十四師團、属ス才十六軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ依進スヘキ命令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ發シアラス。

然シ才十六軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在ヒ才十三師團ヲ指揮シ

遂ニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地ニ築城

2467

飛行軍 人 二四〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇

國境守備隊（三八六隊）人一九六〇。

鉄道守備隊（五隊）人一七五〇。

後方部隊 人 一〇〇〇

計 人 三八六〇

馬 四〇〇〇

ナリシカ開特演、討画三ヨリ行ハシタル増加後関東軍人
人六〇〇〇。馬八〇〇〇ヲ有ス（ニ至シ）。

砲團江八糸、指揮ニアリシ才十四師團三於ノ開特演討画
三基半行ハシタル増加前三十六門、増加後四十八門ナリ。

他、師團も同様二増加ニタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘン。

関東軍増加、際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ

命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス関東軍、勤務者ヨリ聞キタルミナラ

以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私才十四師團、属ス才十六軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ命令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ發シアラス

然シ才十六軍司令官ハ海陸兩三在才十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海陸兩東方萬地野戰築城

ヲ構築セリ。一九四一年夏、凡テノ状態ハ南東軍ニ於テハ蘇聯

開戦準備促進ノ性質ヲ有セリ。

然シ此時日本軍ハ佛伊ヲ侵領セヨリ日本關係ハ急激ニ
尖鋒ノ情況ハ緊迫シ日本ニシテ二途、岐路ニ立タシメタリ
日本政府ハ所謂蘇聯及朝鮮開戦ヲ何シアキニ行フ
ヘキヲ知ラサリキ

一九四一年六月東京御前會議於テ次第三條ヲ決定セラル

1. 独蘇戰ハ独自意見及政策ヲ以テ進ム。

2. 斯萬方作戰準備ヲ進ム。

3. 蘇聯ハ對シ國境警備ヲ守ル。

然シ此時ニ於テモ開戦計畫ニ基テ日本ヨリ南東軍ニ兵力
増加ヲ繼續テラシタルカ以テ日本ハ蘇聯ヲ急激ニ刺撃已

一九四一年十月私ハ才六軍司令官ニ任命セラシタリ固ニ無ク

他、兵团長ト共ニ南東軍司令部ニ呼バシタリ其際南東

軍司令官梅津大將ハ各軍司令官ニ戰時軍、任務團シ

別々訓示ヲ與ヘタリ。私ハ才六軍、參次、如ク訓令ヲ受

ケタリ。才六軍ハ開戦、場合海陸兩陣地及附近、要地ヲ

確保シ得久ヲ策入。一箇月後才六軍ニ一師團ヲ増加入

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然シ持久防衛、時間及用戰、時期二閏シテ梅津大將、私。指示セサリ干、只海拉爾陣地ヲ長期間保持スル在リ私ハ喫ヘラシタル任務ニ基キ八個軍、東方高地ニ從事第十三師團力構築シタル陣地ヲ強化ノ作戰準備ヲ強化エリ、全時彈藥糧秣等半年ヲ目途トシテ海拉爾附近貯藏セリ而シテ一九四三年六月齊々哈爾二於テ才六軍、隸屬スル才二方面軍設置、隊軍司令官阿南惟幾中將ヨリ才二方面軍設置目的及最近、任務又自命、指揮スル才六軍、最遠及將來任務ニシ干説明ヲ受ケタリ此説明ヨリ私ハ東軍力參謀本部ニ於テ決定シタル作戰計畫乙号 秘密名稱ニ基干行ニタル對蘇攻勢、準備ニ關シ承知セリ、開特演、計畫ヨリ日本及支那ヨリ東軍、為人馬及砲彈藥等增加セラル比開特演ハ乙号、名稱アリ一般作戰計畫一部、準備ナリ、茲ニ又阿南中將ハ私ニ作戰第一段階ニ於テ才六軍ハ攻勢作戰ヲ取ルナリ以テ是カ研究及準備ヲ了スヘキ旨旨不セリ、又第二段階ニ於テ才二方面軍主力、作戰計畫ニシ干説明セリ其詳細ハ後二説明ス。

才一段階ニ於テ乙号作戰計畫ニ基干沿海州地ニ、以勒ハ

第一方面軍ニ於テ行フオ第一方面軍ノ攻勢作戦訂画ハ私ハ
一九四四年十月東京ニ於テ前第一方面軍司令官山下大將ヨリ
2467 業務引継ノ際承知セリ又其他此作戦ニシキオ第一方面軍司令官
トシテ牡丹江ニ着任ノ際軍參謀長田手井中將ハ細密ニ説明
セリ、之ヲ以テ私ハ乙号ノ計画ニヨル肉東軍ノ第一第二方面
軍ノ準備及攻勢力作戦ノ經過ニ通曉セリ、此ノ計画ヲ以テ
次ノ处置ヲ取ラレタリ

準備處置

黒河方面 此方面ニ於テ平時オ四軍ニ師團及一國境守備
隊アリ軍司令部ハ孫吳ニ位置ス 對蘇戰前齊哈爾ニ
オ一二方面軍 黑河ニN軍(後ニオ八軍トナルカ如シ)ヲ設置ス
是等ノ編合ハ支那及日本ヨリ四師團ヲ轉用シテ行フ從ツテ
開戦前ニオ一二方面軍ノ兵力ハ六師團ニ達ス其甲孫吳、
オ四軍三師團 黑河、オ八軍ニ師團方面軍一直轄一師團ナリ
19 其他オ二方面軍ニ属スル第六軍ハオ十三師團及阿爾山部隊
(約一師團)開戦後一師團ヲ增加スヘク將來又ニ師團ヲ増加ス
沿海州方面 平時ニ此方面ニ駐在シタルハオ五軍三師團
オ三軍三師團 睽春、オ七十一師團、佳木斯、肉東軍直轄

一師團計八師團十戰車二師團ナリ

2467 一九四二年鶴之谷才三軍司令部ヲ設置シ才三軍二八
才三才五軍ヨリ各一師團ヲ抽出シテ喫ヘシタリ前軍前
二乙号前軍ニヨリ牡丹江才一面軍司令部、同屬才三軍
司令部ヲ設置ス又日本及支那ヨリ此方面ニ新タニ八師團ヲ
轉用ス是ヨリ才一方面軍八十五師團及戰車二師團上ナル
内才五軍三師團戰車一師團、才三軍五師團上戰車一師團
才三軍三師團、才三軍二師團、才一面軍直轄二師團ナリ
此外廣東軍司令官直轄飛行一軍飛行機一千機アリ
廣東軍ハ乙号前軍ニヨリ南戰直前ニ東正面北正面西正面
共ニ斯カル狀態上ナル
攻勢計画、乙号攻勢ノ前軍ヨリ全體東ハカムニ至迄
獲得ヲ豫期ス此攻勢計画ハ四段階ニ別ツ
才一段階ニ於テ才二方面軍、才四軍及N軍ハ孫吳及黑河
附近蘇聯國境ニ於テ不感的行動ヲ行ヒ時々蘇領ヲ射
擊シ以テ攻撃準備ヲ柱フ、然レトモ攻勢ヲ取テスクシテ
要すヲ此方面ニ赤軍ヲ拘束シ若シ赤軍侵入ラバ抑制ス才六
軍ハ海拉爾及阿爾山、陣地ヲ確保ス若シ赤軍ニテ知多方面

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ヨリ滿州里ヲ經テ攻撃シ未ル場合ニハ比等陣地ヲ固守シテ

之ヲ阻止ス比際沿海州方面ガ一方面軍ハ次、計画ヨリ断乎

トシテ攻勢ヲ取ル

a. 才五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前進シ、

ヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方ニ付シ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進才官、
附近ガ一方面軍主力、會戰ニ參加ス

b. 才二軍ハ二師團ヲ以テ琿春ヨリ前進國境ヲ突破シ

南島地ヨリ北進才ロシロフニ向ク其行動ハ方面軍主力ト策
應ス。

c. 才二十軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ南方ニ
向ク興凱湖西南側ヲ經テ才ロシロフニ向ク前進ス

d. 才三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東寧ヨリ才ロシロフニ向ク前進ス
茲ニ於テ方面軍主力ニ參加ス

是等ノ細テノ兵力ハ才ロシロフニ於テ赤軍ヲ制壓シ才ロシロフ

ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シ才浦鹽ヲ

攻囲占領ス。是以テ才一段階ヲ終了ス至十九日約ハ蘇聯

沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲產業地ヨリ沿海州

方面ヨリスル赤軍、航空襲撃等ニ付シ安全ヲラジムニ在リ。

2467

ヨリ満州里ヲ經テ攻撃シ未成場合ニ、比寧陣地ヲ固守シテ

之ヲ阻止ス。比際沿海州方面第一方面軍ハ次、計画ヲ断乎
トシテ攻勢ヲ取ル。

a. 才五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前进シ、
ヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方二村ノ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進オロシ、
附近第一方面軍主力、會戰ニ参加ス。

b. 才二軍ハ二師團ヲ以テ琿春ヨリ前进國境ヲ突破シ
南島地ヨリ北進オロシロフニ向ク其行勦ハ方面軍主力ト策
應ス。

c. 才二十軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安安ヨリ南方ニ
向ク興凱湖西南側ヲ經テオロシロフニ向ク前进ス。

d. 才三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東寧寧ヨリ合テフニ向ク前进ス
茲ニ於テ方面軍主力ニ参加ス。

是等、細テ兵力ハオロシロフニ於テ軍ヲ制壓シオロシ

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ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シア浦塙ヲ

攻圍上領入。是ヲ以テ才一段階ヲ終了ス在十九日卯ハ蘇聯

沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲產業地ヨリ沿海州

方面ヨリスル赤軍、航空艦數千隻シ安全ヲラムルニ在リ。

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第二段階、第一段階、攻勢成功シタル場合ハ占領地区ヲ確保スル
為一部ヲ以テ沿海州ニ残置シ第一方面軍ノ主力ハ北方ニ向ヒ
鉄道ニ沿ヒハバロスクニ前進ス。佳不斯ニアリシ師團ハ「ニスク」
ニ対スル陣地ヲ占領シ此附近ニ於テオ一ツニ方面軍ノ翼側ヲ
掩護ス。此時オニ方面軍ノオ四軍及ノ軍ハオ方面軍ノ
行動ニ策應シテ黒河及其附近ヨリ攻勢ヲ取り「アムル」ヲ渡
河シ「ラゴエ」、「クニブシフカ」、「スネルネ」ヲ確保シ西伯利鉄道ヲ
遮断シ一部ヲ以テ掩護、為西方ニ對セシメ主力ハ東方ニ向ヒ
鉄道ニ沿ヒハバロスニニ前進ス。茲ニ於テオ一ツニ方面軍ハ
策應シテ赤軍ヲ兩方ヨリ夾撃、決戦シ以テ哈府ヲ占領ス
是ヲ以テオニ段階ヲ終ル。

オ三段階、哈府占領後オニ方面軍ハ急速ニ西方ニ轉進シ
將來後貝加爾攻勢作戰、為兵力增加準備ヲ行フ

此時海拉爾ニ在ルオ六軍ハ三師團ヲ増加セラレ兵力四師

團ニ連シ攻撃前進、為準備ヲ行フ

オニ方面軍ハ沿海州ニ於テ重要ナル地区及オニ方面軍ノ後方

ヲ確保ス。

オニ方面軍ノ主力ハ完全ニ準備シタル後ソボネヤシヨリ西方ニ向ヒ

西伯利鉄道ニ沿ヒ知多ニ前進ヲ開始ス。才ニ方面軍、主力
モガリヤニ達スシハ才六軍ハ直ニ三河附近及滿洲里附近
國境ヲ突破シ攻勢ヲ開始入自己、行動ハ才ニ方面軍、主力
ニ策應シ知多及其南方地ニニ前進ス。

知多及其附近ヲ占領後才ニ方面軍ハ西方、宣戦地ニテ確
保シテ才ニ三段階、作戦ヲ終ル。

才四段階、攻勢ニ於テハ優貝加爾及貝加爾ニ至ル迄獲得ス
然シ攻勢計画、才四段階ニ就テハ私ハ承知セ入。

鞍馬作戦 才三段階ニ於テ才六軍ノ前進開始ト共ニ阿爾
山部隊(約一師團)ハ才ニ方面軍、直轄上ナリ滿洲家古
部隊(約一師團)ノ併セ指揮シ阿爾山ヨリ「タムサンボラン」
次テ「バイントメ」、「ヤンオラサモン」ヲ経テ知多ニ向ヒ前進ス。
此部隊ハ東部外蒙ヲ前進シテ才ニ方面軍、右翼ヲ
掩護ス。

大本營ハ綱テ、武力行動ニ策應シ北支ヨリ機械化一兵團
ヲ轉用シ張家口ヨリ庫倫ニ向ヒ作戦行動ヲ開始セム
然シ將來、攻勢行動展開、討伐ハ私ハ承知セサルテ以テ
説明スルコト能ハス

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對蘇攻勢計画、概要以上、如ニ比一九四二年度、對蘇攻勢作戦計画ハ參謀本部南東軍事二立案作製シ
爾後年々更新セリ此日本ノ軍令文处置ノ計画ハ一九四四年
中頃迄存在セリ

日本ハ大東亜聯邦、戰場ノ困難化状態ニ得リタルニ依リ
此計画ヲ実行スルコトハ未得サリナ
比自筆手記言ハ署名ヲ以テ確認入

前南東軍令一万面軍司令官大将 喜多 誠一

訖向者 テエヒラノ干渉任

署名

通訳者 シキエイフン

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證 明 書

余 中佐 G. I. TARANE ト社会主義者として共和国聯邦陸軍、即 負二三、
左記、右 証明ス
該記

記

日本人俘虜陸軍大將喜多誠一依リ 一四月二十日
ヨリ全二十三日迄、間ニ日本語ニ記サシル二十二頁

ヨリ成ル書證、直接複寫寫真、寫ハ、

一九四六年六月二十七日又其前後ニ於テ

社会主義者として共和国聯邦ハハクスケ地方檢察官

ヨリ余ニ引渡サシタル中、並ニ該文書、原本ハハク

スケ地方檢察官、保管書類、中ニ所在スル旨
ラル。

余ハ更ニ左ノヲ 証明ス

(署名及階級) 中佐 タラネ G.I./署名/

日本東京 于テ

一九四六年九月二十六日